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A B S T R A C T   
Under EU Law, Member States are compelled to engage in reciprocal automated forensic DNA profile exchange 
within the so-called Prüm system. Presently, 25 operational EU Member States exchange DNA data within the 
Prüm system to combat terrorism and cross-border crime. This article discusses the perceived risks and benefits 
of the Prüm system on the basis of a set of 37 interviews conducted in 22 EU countries, with 47 professionals 
operating the system (the National Contact Points – NCPs). 
The perceived benefits relate to the intensification of tools for combating transnational criminality; devel-
opment of standardisation and harmonisation of forensic DNA testing procedures; and reinforcement of pro-
fessional cooperation. The perceived risks are associated to the possibility that individuals may be prosecuted on 
the basis of false positives; the lack of available data to measure the effectiveness of the Prüm system; and the 
different modus operandi of police forces and judicial authorities. Our results reveal that perspectives on the risks 
and benefits of the Prüm system significantly vary according to the type of work performed by the NCPs. Our data 
shows a more complex range of perceived benefits and risks than those suggested in previous studies about the 
Prüm system.   
1. Introduction 
The transnational exchange of DNA data has been heralded as an 
increasingly important feature of efforts to create new forms of police 
and judiciary cooperation across international borders, in particular, to 
support criminal investigations of organised crime, control strategies 
and counter-terrorism measures.1–6 The informal exchange of DNA data 
is not new and has often taken place on an ad hoc basis.1,7–9 The tech-
nical implementation of the reciprocal automated searching and the 
comparison and exchange of DNA data between the European Union 
(EU) member countries have been mandatory since August 2011, after 
the Prüm Decision 2008/615/JHA coming into force in August 
2008.10,11 The latest report on the progress of the implementation of 
Prüm, dating from September 2019, indicates that there are 25 EU 
Member States exchanging DNA data. Greece, Ireland and Italy are not 
operational in the Prüm system.12 
With regards to this type of exchange, the Prüm system functions in 
two different steps, as follows: Step 1 refers to the moment when a 
search is made in a national database for a DNA profile retrieved from a 
crime scene and no match is found, the Council Decision permits the 
DNA profile reference to be transmitted and searched in other Member 
States national databases. A notification is then sent to the original 
Member State informing it of a match or no match.1 If a match is 
identified, Step 2 occurs and further requests for information are pro-
cessed through the existing police and/or judicial channels. 
The EU regulations for the Prüm system stipulate that to supply data, 
each Member State must designate a National Contact Point (NCP) 
whose powers are governed by applicable national legislation.10 
Different countries have attributed custody of the national DNA data-
bases to different entities, ranging from judicial authorities to police 
forces. In the vast majority of countries involved in the Prüm system, the 
Ministry of the Interior (or Ministry of Internal Affairs or Ministry of 
Home Affairs) – a government ministry typically responsible for 
policing, emergency management, national security, and immigration 
matters – has custody of the National Forensic DNA Database. In the 
following EU Member States, the Ministry of Justice has custody of the 
National DNA Database: Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Swe-
den. The Ministry of Justice typically has specific duties associated with 
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organising the justice system, overseeing public prosecutors and main-
taining the legal system and public order. As a result, the roles and re-
sponsibilities of the Prüm NCPs may vary among countries, according to 
different organisational structures and national legislation. 
Despite national differences, in general, the NCPs in charge of 
complying with the technical standards for the exchange of DNA data 
information among the Member States on a match/no-match basis, are 
officially called Step 1 NCPs (NCP1). Typically, these NCPs are forensic 
experts working in forensic genetics laboratories or deal with ICT sys-
tems and carry out the routine work that enables DNA data to be 
exchanged transnationally. Step 1 NCPs have to organise and implement 
the necessary procedures and connections to perform automated ex-
changes with other databases (both receiving and sending information), 
perform tests with partners in other countries, and manage and report 
DNA matches. After Step 1 is completed, Step 2 NCPs (NCP2) are in 
charge of the requests for additional information through mutual 
assistance procedures. As a result of differences in organisation and 
jurisdiction of forensic DNA databases across countries, Step 2 of Prüm 
brings together both police and judicial authorities. Taking into 
consideration the diverging rationales that such different entities might 
have concerning to crime control – as police agencies work with inves-
tigative clues and intelligence13 and prosecutors are mainly interested in 
rendering proof – diverging practices and several tensions emerge when 
submitting or responding to international legal assistance procedures.14 
Also, since there is not a standardized format to process information 
within Prüm Step 2, professionals might also use different information 
exchange channels (Swedish Initiative, SIRENE, SIENA, INTERPOL). 
Previous studies about the Prüm system have identified several 
major potential benefits, including fostering closer transnational coop-
eration to combat cross-border crime and terrorism, speeding up the 
exchange of information, and raising efficiency in the detection and 
solving of transnational crime.6,15–17 Other studies have extensively 
analysed the potential risks emerging from the operations of the Prüm 
system, such as the following: the automated comparison of DNA pro-
files has increased the possibility of false positives2 given the volume of 
profiles that are available for comparison18,19; national differences in 
operational, legal and ethical policies, including privacy safeguards, 
raise civil rights concerns3,4,7,8,20–22; there is limited information on the 
overall effectiveness and efficiency of this crime-fighting tool5,6,23; and 
there are diverse issues related to lack of transparency and account-
ability of the Prüm system.1,6,20 
There is a gap in knowledge about how NCPs perceive the risks and 
benefits of Prüm. This article aims to fill that gap by presenting the re-
sults of an empirical study about the views of the Prüm NCPs. This study 
article draws on interviews with professionals who play an active role in 
transnational DNA exchange in the Prüm system, namely NCPs for Step 
1 and Step 2. In particular, we aim to examine how such professionals 
view the risks and benefits of the Prüm system. 
2. Methods 
The data on which our analysis is based includes a total of 37 in-
terviews with 47 professionals in charge of operating the Prüm system. 
These interviews were conducted in 22 EU countries between November 
2015 and May 2018. The criterion for selecting participants was to 
choose professionals acting as NCPs for Step 1 and Step 2 of the Prüm 
system. Participants were recruited by email, letter, and telephone calls. 
We contacted all NCPs which were operational in Prüm in May 2018.3 
Two participants (NCP1) refused to participate and one participant 
(NCP2) has not provided any answer to our requests. 
As detailed in Table 1, twenty interviewees had professional quali-
fications in biology, forensic science and related fields. Besides, eleven 
had professional qualifications in police, nine in law, five in information 
technology and two in other fields. Twenty-seven NCPs were associated 
with police and judicial organizations and twenty with forensic in-
stitutes. In terms of the type of work performed, twenty-two in-
terviewees worked in international cooperation (which aggregates both 
police and judicial authorities), twenty-one worked in the laboratory 
and four in information technology. 
Twenty-six participants were Prüm Step 1 NCPs, seventeen were in 
charge of Prüm Step 2, one was in charge of both Step 1 and Step 2 and 
three were assistants of Prüm Step 1 NCPs. As mentioned earlier, each 
country has the autonomy to define how to assign NCPs roles. This 
implies that, while in some countries only one person is responsible for 
operations associated with Prüm Step 1, in other countries other people 
may be involved in these tasks, being denominated as “assistants of 
Prüm Step 1 NCPs”. In the latter situation, whenever individuals 
demonstrated a willingness to participate in the study, they were 
interviewed. 
The interviews were conducted under the protocols and procedures 
of the European Research Council’s ethics regulations. The script for the 
interviews covered the following themes: i) views and experiences on 
the implementation of Prüm at a national and European level, ii) opin-
ions about Prüm challenges, purposes and contributions; iii) and ethical 
issues raised by Prüm. All NCPs were asked the same questions. Quotes 
about participants’ conception of the risks and benefits of the trans-
national DNA data exchange were coded and subjected to multiple 
readings to develop an in-depth understanding of the meanings 
expressed by the professionals operating the Prüm system. 
Before the interviews, all the participants signed a written informed 
consent document and agreed to be audio-recorded. The interviews took 
place at the participants’ workplaces or a location of their choice. Thirty- 
four interviews were conducted in English, two in Portuguese and one in 
Spanish. All interviews except one were digitally recorded and tran-
Table 1 
Characterisation of interviewed NCPs.  
Professional Qualification 
Biology, forensic science, and related fields 20 
Police 11 
Law 9 
Information Technology 5 
Others 2 
Organisation 
Police and Judiciary 27 
Forensic Institutes 20 
Type of work performed 
Law enforcement international cooperation 22 
Laboratory 21 
Information Technology 4 
Activities related to Prüm 
NCP 1 26 
NCP 2 17 
Assistants of NCP1 3 
NCP 1 and NCP 2 1 
Total number of participants 47 
Source: Interviews with Prüm NCPs in 22 EU Member States 
2 As defined by Council Decisions, a full match implies that all the allele 
values of the compared loci are the same in the requested and requesting DNA 
profiles. Near matches are accepted in Prüm when the value of only one of all 
the compared alleles is different (one mismatch). However, Kees van der Beek 
showed that near matches consisting of six loci plus a mismatch are almost 
certainly false positives – i.e., a declared match that is invalid – or false- 
negative – a match not found due to a mistake in a DNA profile. Therefore, 
the Netherlands does not provide demographic data for near matches without 
the guarantee of confirmatory testing.18 Nevertheless, it remains unclear how 
other countries proceed with near matches.8,19 3 Until May 2018 only 23 countries were operational.47 
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scribed verbatim. When necessary, interviews were translated into En-
glish by professional services. 
The interview quotes were then systematically compared, con-
trasted, synthesised and coded by theme and thematic category 
following the principles of content analysis in qualitative research24,25 
using an approach which combines manifest and latent analysis con-
texts.26 The two authors performed the analysis separately and discussed 
their results until they obtained a consensus. After the categorisation 
process, a table was produced with a description of themes and thematic 
categories found during the data analysis, as well as interview quotes 
that the two authors found to be the most exemplary (Table 2).27 To 
protect the identity of the participants, a letter and number were 
attributed to each interview. The letter refers to the country and the 
number to the sequence in time of the conduction of the interview in the 
respective country. 
3. Results 
The analysis of the interviews showed that participants in this study 
had the view that the major potential benefit of the Prüm system is to 
improve crime-fighting at a transnational level. One additional priority 
topic highlighted by the interviewees was the Prüm system might speed 
up police cooperation among different EU countries. 
This study fills gaps in previous research regarding the views 
expressed by the Prüm NCPs concerning data protection issues, in which 
opposing views coexist. On the one hand, some participants pointed out 
that the Prüm system has created higher standards for data protection 
issues. Such opinion was justified by the participants by referring to 
practices such as the anonymisation processes applied to DNA profiles 
and the separation between exchanging DNA data (step 1) and 
requesting/receiving further information (step 2). Other participants 
stated that the Prüm system might exacerbate data protection issues due 
to the differences in national legislations. These differencing perspec-
tives can be reconciled by establishing higher standards for data pro-
tection resulting from consensus among NCPs from different countries. 
Some interviewees outlined that one overall risk of the Prüm system 
relates to its current state of affairs: at present, there are 25 operational 
countries, but such countries have different levels of connections. For 
instance, while the Netherlands and Austria are connected to 23 coun-
tries, Bulgaria is exchanging DNA data with 9 countries and the United 
Kingdom with 1 country.12 
Other perceived risks and benefits tend to be differentiated according 
to the type of work and activities related to Prüm that the NCPs have to 
perform. In particular, a significant differentiation emerges between 
NCPs conducting laboratory work (this group of participants is mostly 
associated with Prüm step 1), and NCPs working within law enforce-
ment international cooperation forces (Prüm step 2 procedures). 
NCPs working in laboratories declared as advantages of the trans-
national exchange of DNA data the harmonisation of forensic DNA 
analysis procedures among different countries; the upgrading of DNA 
national databases and procedures for forensic DNA analysis; and the 
opening up of possibilities to interact with colleagues based in different 
countries, which poses new opportunities for scientific cooperation. 
Regarding risks, the topic most frequently cited by NCPs working in 
laboratories regards the possibility of the occurrence of false positives/ 
adventitious matches. Coupled to this issue, participants mentioned 
existing differences between EU countries in terms of procedures for 
reporting matches and, associated with that, their reservations about the 
lack of quality in forensic analysis in other countries. Finally, NCPs 
working in laboratories also identified as possible risks the inexistence of 
feedback on what was the final output (if any) generated by the 
communication of DNA matches to another EU country. As a result, 
participants do not have information that allows them to perceive the 
effectiveness of the Prüm system. 
The Prüm NCPs working in the field of law enforcement international 
cooperation, and more associated with Prüm Step 2 procedures, 
primarily emphasised how the Prüm system can improve transnational 
mechanisms of cooperation within criminal investigations. Participants 
mainly mentioned that the Prüm system might make it possible to speed 
up criminal investigations and the upgrading and reinforcement of the 
principle of availability, introduced by the Hague programme.28 This 
principle stipulates that information available to law enforcement au-
thorities in one Member State shall also be made accessible to equivalent 
authorities in the other Member States. 
In regard to perceptions of risks, the Prüm NCPs working in law 
enforcement international cooperation emphasised the challenges posed 
by the different modus operandi of police and judicial authorities; the 
excessive focus on DNA matches to measure the efficiency of the Prüm 
system; the scarce standardisation of procedures for requesting infor-
mation from other countries in step 2 of Prüm; and the potential use of 
false positives in legal actions. 
Regardless of the type of work conducted (either as NCPs in Step 1 or 
2) interviewees thereby agree that standardisation of procedures at a 
transnational level is utterly beneficial and, in cases in which it has not 
been implemented or current procedures are outdated, extremely 
necessary. This regards, for example, the need to update standards for 
reporting matches in step 1 and for defining which channels should be 
used when exchanging information in step 2. NCPs in step 1 and 2 of 
Prüm also show similar concerns regarding the potential risks of 
reporting and/or following up false positives. The main point of 
disagreement relates to the measurement of the efficiency of Prüm 
system. NCPs working in step 1 call for the need to know if DNA hits 
were (or not) followed up by criminal investigations and what was the 
outcome. According to their accounts, this would be the way of under-
standing the efficiency of Prüm system. By opposition, NCPs working in 
step 2 tend to be highly critical of what they perceive as being an 
“excessive focus” on DNA hits. Their view is that forensic DNA data is 
merely one piece of information that might, or might not, become sig-
nificant in a given criminal case and, as such, the efficacy of Prüm should 
not be measured according to the number of matches resulting in 
criminal convictions. 
4. Discussion 
The interviews conducted with Prüm National Contact Points indi-
cate an overall willingness to highlight the benefits of the DNA data 
exchange in the Prüm system: the participants in this study emphasised 
the Prüm system’s role in improving crime-fighting at a transnational 
level, and the potentialities to serve as a tool in supporting faster and 
more effective criminal investigation.15,16,21 These expectations are in 
line with previous studies which indicate that the DNA matches gener-
ated within mechanisms of transnational cooperation are viewed as 
being potentially useful for intelligence-led police work in terms of 
opening up new possibilities for criminal investigation.2,9,29 
In terms of balancing risks and benefits, our results show a more 
nuanced scenario than that suggested in previous studies about the Prüm 
system. The key findings of our study which fill up the gap in previous 
research relate to the contraposing views on data protection coexist in 
the narratives of NCPs. Contrary to what previous studies in the domain 
of social sciences have indicated in regards to the Prüm system, several 
participants in this study do not foresee considerable risks related to 
data protection or lack of ethical oversight of the transnational flow of 
law enforcement information.1,3,4,7,8 Interviewees mentioned that 
stricter data protection rules have been imposed by the Prüm system. As 
a result, according to their view, the amount of personal data circulating 
across borders probably decreased, rather than increased.3 The risks 
associated with data protection pointed out by some interviewees were 
mainly directed to different approaches that countries might adopt for 
dealing with personal data information.1,6,19 This nuanced and ambig-
uous positioning regarding data protection and privacy issues concurs 
with previous studies conducted with stakeholders who work in the 
criminal justice system and forensic genetics. These studies have shown 
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Table 2 
Perceived risks and benefits of the Prüm system.   
Thematic Categories 
Benefits Quotations Risks Quotations 
Overview Improve crime-fighting at 
a transnational level 
The benefits are clear, we send together, to 
each other, every DNA profile that is taken 
from a crime scene in [country], or from a 
suspect, to all the other Prüm countries, so 
we have the opportunity to get much more 
hits compared with only doing the 
comparison nationally. O02 
Exacerbation of data 
protection issues 
As regards to risks, well, a major risk is data 
protection. The way in which [country] 
regards data protection and the way in 
which [another country] may regard data 
protection could be different. W01 
Speed up police 
cooperation among 
different EU countries 
The benefits are clear, we send together, to 
each other, every DNA profile that is taken 
from a crime scene in [country], or from a 
suspect, to all the other Prüm countries, so 
we have the opportunity to get much more 
hits compared with only doing the 
comparison nationally. O02 
The benefit is that you can find very quick 
matches from travelling people who 
commit crimes. U02 
Current incomplete 
country connections might 
lead to loss of intelligence 
There are several countries not linked (…) so 
that a lot of police officers (…) expect that as 
soon as they enter into the database, they are 
automatically checked everywhere in 
Europe and that if they do not get a hit it 
means that there is no DNA hit in the whole 
of Europe, which is the wrong 
interpretation. O02 
The risk is that I may be sending out a 
request to countries that are not connected 
to Prüm, for some reason we consider that 
they are Prüm when they are not. (…) The 
fact that not all countries are operational is 
causing risks, for me, that is the major thing. 
W01 
Higher standards for data 
protection issues 
I think that the two-step approach – first, 
compare DNA profiles and then, if you find 
a match, go and exchange the case and 
personal information– is a good measure to 
protect the privacy of the people involved. 
A01 
There is no invasion of your private life, 
because everything that is exchanged is 
anonymous. I02  
Laboratory Harmonisation of forensic 
DNA analysis procedures 
among different countries 
Since Prüm started, we had more 
discussions about inclusion rules, matching 
rules, reporting rules (…) We now know 
that we have international matches and we 
need to be more harmonised. (…) If we 
didn’t have Prüm, each country would be 
completely separated from the others, they 
do on their own, and we wouldn’t need to 
discuss, really. I01 
False positives/ 
Adventitious matches 
In terms of risks, from a forensic point of 
view, adventitious matches (…) [If] the 
person using the information does not 
realise that there is a possibility that it is not 
an actual match, even though it looks like a 
match. V01 
Upgrading DNA databases 
and procedures of forensic 
DNA analysis 
We managed to acquire a system locally – 
thanks to the funding from the European 
Union – which I do not think we would 
otherwise have been able to purchase. But 
it was a great helping hand for our 
laboratory. X01 
Differences of procedures 
for reporting matches 
We have good procedures in place to make 
sure that we first find out if it is a good 
match before it is reported to the authorities. 
I think that in [my country] there is no risk 
of a false positive match being used for legal 
actions. But I am not sure whether this is also 
the case in other countries. A01 
Opportunities for 
scientific cooperation 
Benefits can be that we can be directly 
connected with the operation of other 
countries, with their work and their 
laboratory rules. Because these rules 
should be similar in all countries, but every 
country also has some different practices. 
(…) We can learn from each other and visit 
each other by cooperation. L01 
Inexistence of feedback We actually have had no feedback on what 
benefits have been, if there have been many 
cases solved, we do not know because we 
don’t get any feedback. B01 
Law enforcement 
international 
cooperation 
Improve transnational 
mechanisms of police 
cooperation 
When you do an investigation with the 
international case officers, you can put a 
puzzle [together]. You could not do that 
before (…). Prüm gives us the abilities to 
do this. U01 
Different modus operandi 
of police and judicial 
authorities 
It’s a pity [that some countries] (…) are 
obliged to go through the judicial network. 
Because the exchange is really slow, and 
most of the time incomplete, compared with 
what we can do in the police. H02 
Speed up criminal 
investigations 
We are able now to cross-check in the 
speediest way with countries. H02 
Excessive focus on DNA 
matches to measure the 
efficiency of the Prüm 
system 
If I am the director of a lab I say: “OK, 
highest quality, and I could never make an 
error because when I have a hit it is 100% 
correct”. But sorry, for this kind of solution I 
could just as well have a trained monkey in 
the laboratory. M01 
Reinforcement of the 
principle of availability 
The main benefits are that information is 
now more available. X02 
Scarce standardisation of 
Step 2 of Prüm 
Despite the fact that there is a Prüm Treaty, 
there is some leeway. And I think that not all 
countries have the same point of contact. 
Some use INTERPOL, some use SIRENE, 
some use EUROPOL. It would be better if 
there is one point of contact. X02  
(continued on next page) 
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that different professionals groups tend to highlight forensic uses of DNA 
as highly beneficial resources for fighting crime and improving justice, 
whereas the ethical risks are relatively devalued.30,31 
One other risk mentioned by several interviewees performing 
different types of activities within the Prüm system relates to the 
incomplete state of connections.18 To the best of our knowledge this 
topic has not been covered in any previous study before. Two main is-
sues should be highlighted. Firstly, such a scenario may pose a risk since 
it may lead to potential problems based on the wrong assumption that 
Prüm already allows exchanging data with all EU countries. Secondly, 
relevant information may be lost due to the impossibility of quickly 
exchanging data with countries that are not operational within Prüm. 
This result stands in line with previous studies about police trans-
national cooperation which emphasise the need for more expansive and 
faster exchange of intelligence.2,7,8,15,16,18,23,32,33 
Also, our analysis demonstrates that the perceived risks and benefits 
of Prüm are highly influenced by the activities NCP perform within the 
transnational exchange of DNA data. In particular, a relevant distinction 
emerges between NCPs working in laboratories and NCPs working in 
law enforcement international cooperation. This result is in accordance 
with previous studies about public perspectives on science and tech-
nology in general that indicate that professional socialisation and aca-
demic background influence perceptions of the risks of science and 
technology.34 As such, our results bring forward a more detailed and 
nuanced scenario about perspectives held by professionals actively 
involved with Prüm. 
For NCPs working in laboratories, the perceived benefits related to 
the improvement of standardisation and harmonisation of forensic DNA 
analysis are in line with the historical trajectory of forensic DNA 
profiling and databasing, which is built upon the design, validation and 
dissemination of standards.35,36,37 A previous study about the Prüm 
system indicates that the current practice is orientated towards the 
adoption of minimum standards. This position permits flexibility and 
autonomy at a local level since it enables interoperability of DNA da-
tabases to exist in a scenario of national differentiation.16 
Previous studies on the Prüm system have demonstrated how 
considerable differences between EU Members, which have distinctive 
levels of development of forensic DNA databases and DNA 
profiling,3,4,18 as well as unequal financial and human resources, pose 
several challenges to the viability of operating system.1,3,5 Our results 
reveal a more complex scenario. As previous literature demonstrates, 
NCPs working in laboratories point out the perceived benefits of some 
countries upgrading their forensic DNA databases and procedures of 
forensic DNA analysis and learning with more technologically advanced 
ones.16,19 As a result, differences between countries are, at least 
partially, framed by NCPs as possibilities to learn and enhance scientific 
cooperation. 
Regarding risks, NCPs working in laboratories mainly refer to the 
issues associated with the occurrence of false positives. This perceived 
risk is in line with previous studies about the concerns showed by Prüm 
NCPs in regards to false positives leading to false incrimination, the 
different quality assessment used in each country, and the potential 
pressure to confirm “near matches” as reliable leads.5,8,19,22 One study 
also provided empirical evidence that NCPs of the Prüm system who 
work in laboratories tend to be critical about police procedures.22 
The view about the lack of adequate protocol for reporting matches 
reported by the participants in this study as a risk relates to what studies 
in the field of forensic sciences have consistently reported about the 
challenges of communicating, to the court, probabilistic results and 
likelihood ratios related to DNA evidence in typical identification 
casework.38,39 Finally, NCPs working in laboratories cite the inexistence 
of feedback on cases that were followed-up and lead to a conviction, and 
the lack of statistics to measure the effectiveness as a risk. Such posi-
tionings are linked to widely discussed issues relating to the limited 
information on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of this 
crime-fighting tool5,6,23; and the diverse issues concerning the lack of 
transparency and accountability of the Prüm system.1,6,20 
Regarding NCPs working within law enforcement international 
cooperation, the Prüm system is seen as one instrument that allows 
supporting cooperation across borders, anchored on the principle of 
availability of information.28 In terms of perceived risks, the ones 
associated with differences between the practices of police and judicial 
entities have been already explored in previous studies. Such studies 
show that professionals working in police transnational cooperation 
tend to see judicial authorities’ methods as time-consuming and too 
restricted.14,33,40 Besides, interviewed NCPs’ views about the risks of an 
excessive focus on DNA matches to measure the efficiency of the Prüm 
system are in accordance with what a considerable body of literature has 
already revealed about over-expectations towards the capability of DNA 
evidence to solve criminal cases.41–43 This result is also in line with 
previous studies which demonstrate an enhanced sensitivity among law 
enforcement professionals regarding the contingencies of forensic 
work.14,44 Finally, NCPs working within law enforcement international 
cooperation point out the scarce standardisation of Step 2 of Prüm and 
the associated operational challenges, a topic that has also been outlined 
by other studies focusing on the utility of the Prüm system.6,18 
5. Conclusion 
This article discussed the perceived risks and benefits of the Prüm 
system based on a set of 37 interviews conducted in 22 EU countries, 
with 47 professionals operating the Prüm system. The major perceived 
benefits relate to the intensification of tools for combating transnational 
criminality; development of standardisation and harmonisation of 
forensic DNA testing procedures; and reinforcement of professional 
cooperation. The major perceived risks are associated to the possibility 
of prosecuting based on false positives; the lack of available data to 
measure the effectiveness of the Prüm system and the different modus 
operandi of police and judicial authorities. 
One limitation of this study is that our analysis does not capture how 
the perceived risks and benefits might be affected by the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the different national contexts. In particular, how 
countries’ positioning towards political power, economic resources and 
level of development of forensic science affect perceptions over the 
Prüm system. As such, an in-depth analysis of this topic is still required 
to capture how different countries are framing the benefits and risks 
Table 2 (continued )  
Thematic Categories 
Benefits Quotations Risks Quotations 
The potential use of false 
positives in legal actions 
And what we see is that some countries give 
information that is not sufficiently verified. 
(…) We think this is a risk because if you 
give information in such a case that means 
there could be a chance of 60% that the right 
person is also there, but also 40% that you 
have been dealing with the wrong person. 
A04 
Source: Interviews with Prüm NCPs in 22 EU Member States 
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delivered by implementation of the Prüm system. It would also be of 
utmost interest if forthcoming research took into consideration the 
views of other professional groups who are also involved or affected by 
Prüm. In addition, one other limitation of the present study relates to the 
conduction of joint interviews in some particular national cases. The use 
of joint interviews might prevent certain types of data from emerging. 
By providing a complex, detailed and nuanced scenario of how NCPs 
conceive the risks and benefits of Prüm, this article contributes to filling 
a gap in the literature. Besides, it is highly likely that the Commission 
will soon propose amendments to the Prüm regime.45 As such, the 
analysis of the views conveyed by NCPs – as actors actively involved in 
the system – might help to propose amendments founded on principles 
of transparency and accountability. 
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